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Technical witnesses have revolutionized the American lawsuit.
Advertisments in litigation periodicals bear witness to the broad
range of courtroom expert testimony available to the trial bar. A
specialist in airplane pilot error places an advertisement on the
same page with an advertiser who is "[e]minently qualified to pro-
vide expert testimony in churning securities litigation."' Also in-
cluded are obscenity experts for criminal cases as well as a timber
products specialist with "global experience in accidents and related
cases," who claims, "[m]ore than 30 years experience with wood
utility poles."' 2 Within the category of timber and woods there are
other experts as well. A national directory exists for locating ex-
perts whose specialties are "[a]ccidents and injuries caused by
trees."3
The offerings of available technical services of course include
traditional specialties. Experts in document and handwriting anal-
yses may be found along with a plethora of physicians. Some doc-
tors have entered the courtroom expert market with enthusiasm.
One recent advertisement promoting "Heavyweight Malpractice
Experts. Any type physician, surgeon or medical expert available"
features a photograph of a "fighting doctor" clad in white coat and
boxing gloves.4
*John Byrd Martin Professor of Law, University of Georgia. B.A. 1956, Augustana Col-
lege; J.D. 1959, Northwestern University (Clarion De Witt Hardy Scholar); LL.M. 1961, Ge-
orgetown University (E. Barrett Prettyman Fellow in Trial Advocacy).
1. 21 TRIAL, Dec. 1985, at 103; see also 90 CASE & COMMENT, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 60-63.
2. 21 TRIAL, Sept. 1985, at 91.
3. Id. (referring to the MEMBERSHIP DIRECTORY OF AMERICAN SocmiY OF CONSULTING
ARBORISTS IN U.S. AND CANADA).
4. 21 TRIAL, supra note 1, at 96. The ad continues, "Two of our recent cases settled for
$1.45 million and $990,000.00!" Id.
Expert witness networks of various kinds have developed. For example, the Technical
Advisory Service for Attorneys ("TASA") provides a central source of experts, and claims
that "TASA's computer contains 8,000 experts in 3,000 categories." There also are printed
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The expanding array of scientific (as well as some not-so-sci-
entific) specialties available as sources for testimony raises hard
questions. Will courts require that the witness' opinions be reason-
ably based upon trustworthy data? How far must judges inquire
into the practice of other experts in the same field prior to allowing
the trial witness to proffer an expert opinion? How much of the
expert's supporting data will be received in evidence? This Essay
addresses these and other important questions affecting the scope
of modern expert testimony.
II. THE BASES FOR EXPERT OPINION
The federal jury or bench trial usually is marked by the ap-
pearance of at least a few, if not several, expert witnesses. What
these experts have to say may be based on material that is far dif-
ferent than it would have been fifteen or twenty years ago. With
the advent of Federal Evidence Rule 703, the expert can form his
opinion from many different reports and documents that formerly
would have made the opinion inadmissible. Thus, objections such
as "Objection, she is basing her expert opinion on out-of-court
hearsay" are no longer automatically sustained.
5
The litmus test for admission or exclusion of an expert's opin-
ion based upon reports of others is the reasonableness of the testi-
fying expert's reliance on such reports. If the underlying facts or
data that helped the expert reach conclusions are of a type on
which other experts in the field customarily rely, most courts will
permit the expert to testify. Accordingly, a question or two along
directories of technicians and experts. See, e.g., DIRECTORY OF EXPERT WITNESSES IN TECH-
NOLOGY (1985), reviewed in 71 A.BA J. 74 (1985).
5. Honoring such an objection may result in reversible error. See, e.g., State v. Henze,
356 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1984). The prosecution in Henze sought to show that defendant was
intoxicated at the time of his arrest. A doctor who had examined defendant shortly after his
arrest also reviewed defendant's medical records, which had been prepared by other doctors.
Relying partly on his own observations of defendant on the night of the arrest and partly on
his later review of defendant's medical records, the testifying doctor was prepared to state
that defendant's behavior did not require a conclusion that he was intoxicated. The trial
judge sustained a hearsay objection that targeted the underlying medical records as an im-
proper basis for testimony. Applying a state rule modeled after Federal Evidence Rule 703,
the state supreme court reversed. The court stated:
We may and do hereby judicially notice the fact that doctors customarily rely on medi-
cal records prepared by other doctors in forming opinions about their patients'
conditions.
We conclude, therefore, that Dr. Berstler's proffered testimony was admissible
under rule 703 and the hearsay objection was not tenable. The trial court erred in
excluding the testimony on hearsay grounds.
Id. at 540 (footnote and citations omitted).
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these lines to counsel's expert may be helpful, especially when the
trial judge applies stringent rules of procedure: "Dr. Watson, in
reaching a diagnosis regarding a patient in the day-to-day practice
of orthopedic medicine, do you regularly rely on radiology reports
such as those produced on the plaintiff by Medicus Radiology
Clinic? Is that also the practice of other orthopedists?"
In a typical case, once the expert identifies the basis for his
opinion, the expert will proceed to propound his conclusions.
There will be occasions, however, when a genuine issue is raised
concerning the trustworthiness of the background data relied upon
by an expert. The recent federal district court decision in In re
"Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation6 underlined the
trustworthiness question.
A. Agent Orange Litigation
Of the numerous opinions issued in mid-1985 in litigation sur-
rounding the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam, perhaps the most
important one explored the question of expert qualifications, as
well as the foundation for technical opinions. This well-researched
effort by Chief Judge Weinstein of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York decided whether Viet-
nam veterans and their families could maintain a suit against sev-
eral chemical companies who manufactured Agent Orange for the
federal government. Some litigants proceeded in a class action;
others did not join in the class. The court's decision affected veter-
ans who opted out of the class. A central issue concerned the pro-
bative worth of expert medical opinions, most notably causation
opinions by a hematologist and a pathologist.
The factual setting for Agent Orange developed out of the Vi-
etnam War. Private corporations supplied the government with
Agent Orange, a herbicide containing toxic chemicals. Many veter-
ans who were exposed to this defoliating substance, as well as sev-
eral family members, sued the manufacturing companies. Seven
chemical companies moved for summary judgment, asserting that
plaintiffs could not identify the individual manufacturer of the
Agent Orange to which a given veteran was exposed and that
plaintiffs could not prove that exposure to Agent Orange caused
their injuries.7 This latter objection led to one of the most compre-
hensive judicial discussions to date of modern expert opinion
6. 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).




It should be noted that Chief Judge Weinstein announced the
expert opinion rules in the context of a summary judgment motion.
The question before the Agent Orange court was whether plaintiffs
had met their burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of fact.
Plaintiffs had introduced expert proof in affidavit form, which con-
cluded that plaintiffs' current diseases and afflictions resulted from
Agent Orange. Finding that the proposed expert evidence lacked a
solid basis, the court held that the affidavits failed to comply with
Federal Evidence Rule 703. Defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment was granted, and the case was dismissed. The test applied by
the court was whether, assuming the proposed proofs were pro-
duced at trial, the chemical companies would be entitled to a di-
rected verdict. Because the court applied a trial-type test, the
Agent Orange opinion is relevant for establishing both trial and
pretrial standards applicable to expert proof. The court was con-
vinced that there was "no doubt that a directed verdict at the close
of each of plaintiffs' cases would be required."8
Avoiding protracted and expensive trials when the end result
will be a directed verdict is a sensible goal. Summary judgment is a
valuable tool for eliminating these costly burdens when only specu-
lative issues of fact exist. A decisive question that frequently arises
in making this judgment is whether the plaintiff's expert has a
well-founded opinion, or whether the expert's opinion is based on
unsound or theoretical speculations. This issue dominates the
forty-two page decision in Agent Orange. When an expert relies on
hearsay information, it must at least be the type of information
normally employed by other experts in the field. The Agent Or-
ange court concluded that absent such a showing the proffered evi-
dence failed to meet the requirements of Rule 703.
One plaintiff's doctor formed his opinion by relying on forms
completed by veterans that incorporated a checklist of symptoms
attributable to their exposure to Agent Orange while in Vietnam.
Items like skin disorders, fatigue, memory loss, anger, and other
symptoms appeared on these forms. The trial court critically re-
viewed the expert's reliance on the material:
Plaintiffs' checklists and "affidavits," illustrated by Appendix "A" to this
opinion, submitted with Dr. Singer's affidavits are not material that experts
in this field would reasonably rely upon and so must be excluded under Rule
703. . . . The court takes judicial notice-based on hundreds of trials-that
no reputable physician relies on hearsay checklists by litigants to reach a con-
8. Id. at 1260.
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clusion with respect to the cause of their afflictions.9
Another physician who supported plaintiffs' case relied "in the
main on the same self-serving hearsay used by Dr. Singer."' 10 The
court was similarly critical of that physician's testimony: "Plain-
tiffs have submitted no evidence that other physicians would rely
upon material of this kind in reaching a medical conclusion about
causation."11
The court dismissed plaintiffs' claims after analyzing (1) epi-
demiological studies that showed that there is no evidence that pa-
ternal exposure to Agent Orange causes birth defects, (2) an Air
Force survey that concluded that there is insufficient evidence to
support a cause and effect relationship between herbicide exposure
and adverse health, and (3) an Australian report finding no statis-
tically significant difference in death rates from cancer among vet-
erans and nonveterans.1 2 Central to the perceived inadequacy of
the lawsuit was the litigants' inability to eliminate other possible
causes of plaintiffs' illnesses.13 The court observed that many
health complaints registered in the case were "frequently identified
with Vietnam stress syndrome due to battle and other military
stresses. 1 4 The court further found that "[w]hile many plaintiffs
have become bald since leaving Vietnam, baldness is often a natu-
ral part of aging. 1 5 The court thus concluded that the fatal flaws
in plaintiffs' action were unconvincing proof of causation and inap-
propriate expert reliance on hearsay.
B. Testing Expert Proof
Whether one agrees or disagrees with Judge Weinstein's reso-
lution of summary judgment under the facts in Agent Orange,
there should be little dissension regarding his suggested mechanics
for testing expert opinion. The apparatus the opinion provides for
accomplishing this task is sound and provides valuable guidance
when the issue is hotly contested. The legal analysis contained in
the decision begins with the proposition that the Federal Rules of
9. Id. at 1246.
10. Id. at 1247.
11. Id. at 1248.
12. The court also cited other reports. "[A]ll reliable studies of the effect of Agent
Orange on members of the class so far published provide no support for plaintiffs' claims of
causation." Id. at 1231.
13. Id. at 1250.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1251.
1986]
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Evidence require trial judges to "make a preliminary inquiry into
the admissibility of expert testimony."' 6 The opinion provides:
"The court must first determine whether the expert is sufficiently
qualified in his or her field to be allowed to testify. The court must
also determine whether the proffered evidence would be helpful to
the trier of fact, although doubts should be resolved in favor of
admissibility."' In Agent Orange the credentials of the two major
medical witnesses satisfied these requirements of expert witness
qualification. Furthermore, under the helpfulness standard of Fed-
eral Evidence Rule 702,18 the scientific techniques used by these
experts should have been considered acceptable.
Nevertheless, qualifying as an expert in a relevant field, pro-
viding testimony that meets the helpfulness standard, and using an
acceptable analytical technique 9 are factors that do not always
guarantee admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule
703 imposes an additional test for admissibility. The trial court
must decide whether the data used by the expert to prepare his or
her opinion in the litigated case is of a type reasonably and cus-
tomarily relied upon by other experts in the field.20 Some appellate
16. Id. at 1239 ("In determining whether an expert opinion is sufficient to withstand a
summary judgment motion, courts undertake a detailed inquiry into the admissibility of the
proffered testimony."). Many summary judgment cases have examined expert testimony.
See, e.g., American Key Corp. v. Cole Nat'l Corp., 762 F.2d 1569 (11th Cir. 1985); Bieghler
v. Kleppe, 633 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1980).
17. 611 F. Supp. at 1242 (citations omitted). The trial judge should exercise special
care in evaluating expert qualifications and the subject of the expert's testimony when the
proposed testimony lies at "the periphery of what the scientific community considers ac-
ceptable." Id. The court notes two competing approaches to novel scientific proof by com-
paring United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117
(1979), with Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). For analysis of the Frye test
see R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF EVIDENCE 219-
21 (1983); Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUm L. Rav. 1197 (1980). Frye-type problems are usually consid-
ered under Federal Evidence Rule 702.
18. The test set out in Rule 702 is whether the testimony will assist the trier of fact.
See FED. R. EvID. 702.
19. In short, complying with Federal Evidence Rule 702.
20. FED. R. EVID. 703. The courtroom foundation for expert opinion based in whole or
in part on out of court hearsay frequently includes preliminary questions concerning the
specialist's own reliance on the unadmitted data, as well as the practice of other experts in
the field. R. CARLSON, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES FOR CIVIL TRIALS § 4:20, at 219 (1983).
In Agent Orange the court found it significant that none of plaintiffs' experts asserted
that they normally relied on hearsay checklists like those offered at trial to diagnose a pa-
tient. What the court termed the "bald assertion of plaintiffs' counsel that Dr. Singer's affi-
davit was 'based upon the kind of information which any treating or examining physician
would require in rendering an opinion'" did not suffice in the court's view. "Instead, courts
look to evidence from experts in the field about the reliability of the materials in question as
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courts go further and impose a requirement that the trial judge
separately determine the trustworthiness of the particular data un-
derlying the expert's opinion.21
Agent Orange follows the latter view:
[T]he court may not abdicate its independent responsibilities to decide if the
bases meet minimum standards of reliability as a condition of admissibility.
If the underlying data are so lacking in probative force and reliability that no
reasonable expert could base an opinion on them, an opinion which rests en-
tirely upon them must be excluded.
22
Finding the underlying data faulty, the Agent Orange court ex-
cluded the expert opinions.
Because of the disposition in Agent Orange, an important ex-
pert witness issue was never reached: the role of supporting data
once an expert's opinion is deemed admissible. For example, after
an expert testifies in a jury trial, does the background data from
which he derived his conclusions become admissible evidence on
behalf of the proponent of the expert witness? Because this issue
has practical impact in cases that do proceed to trial, it requires
discussion here.
C. Challenging the Admission of Supporting Data
An apt analogy exists between practice under Federal Evi-
dence Rules 703 and 612. Rule 612 controls procedure when a wit-
ness refreshes his memory from a writing prepared by himself or
another. Suppose a witness has a failure of memory during direct
examination. When the witness accomplishes the refreshing pro-
cess on the witness stand in front of a jury, there is consensus that
the underlying document does not come into evidence merely be-
cause it refreshed recollection. Introduction options belong to the
well as their own experience and common sense." 611 F. Supp. at 1246 (citation omitted);
see also Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony: Limitations on Affirmative Intro-
duction of Underlying Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 234, 241 (1984) ("If the judge decides that
the data is not reasonably relied upon, he may bar the expert's opinion altogether, bar it to
the extent it relies on impermissible data, or only bar references to the impermissible
data.").
21. 611 F. Supp. at 1244 (citing Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony, supra
note 20, at 240-41 & n.26). The Agent Orange court adverted to a liberal view, wherein
experts are allowed to base opinions on material relied upon by other experts in the field
without separately determining the trustworthiness of the underlying data. Id. In support of
this view, the court cited the Third Circuit's decision in In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Anti-
trust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 1863 (1985). See 611 F.
Supp. at 1244. For an enlarged discussion of this issue, see infra notes 41-49 and accompa-
nying text.
22. Id. at 1245 (citations omitted).
19861
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cross-examiner, not to the proponent of a witness who needed to
look at a document in order to provide direct testimony.
Similarly, an expert whose opinion required extrinsic data may
identify and briefly describe the supporting out-of-court document
that gave rise to his conclusions. To go further and allow the ad-
mission of an unauthenticated writing into evidence or to permit
the testifying expert to quote extensively from that writing violates
accepted hearsay norms. Furthermore, in a criminal case, when a
prosecutor directs an expert called by the state to read from an
underlying report prepared by another person, the defendant's
constitutional right to confront the adverse witness is abridged.
That the trial witness relied on the extrinsic report makes little
difference. The outside report remains hearsay and is not admissi-
ble in evidence unless the proponent lays a proper foundation.
While hearsay and confrontation concerns would seem minimal
when an expert simply identifies a background document as a basis
for his opinion,3 reporting fully to the jury from the conclusions of
nontestifying experts is improper.
24
Courts have not always appreciated the fine but important
distinction between allowing an extra-record report to form a basis
for courtroom opinion and permitting the whole of the report to
come into evidence. On the other hand, many courts have under-
stood the vice of free introduction of underlying data.2 Of course,
most experts will not rely exclusively on reports of others but will
have first-hand contact with the subject. A doctor, for example,
usually will have examined the patient. There will be, however,
many instances when the physician augments his own examination
with the lab studies or reports of other doctors. 6 With technical
23. Perhaps a description by the witness of the general subjects discussed in underly-
ing reports would be unassailable as well. Beyond that, introduction of a copy of the report
or recitation of its contents, including conclusions, raises profound hearsay and confronta-
tion objections.
24. See State v. Towne, 142 Vt. 241, 453 A.2d 1133 (1982).
25. See, e.g., Curry v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 779 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1985); Barrel of Fun,
Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984); Rose Hall, Ltd. v.
Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corp., 576 F. Supp. 107, 158 (D. Del. 1983), aff'd, 740
F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 909 (1985); People v. Robinson, 417 Mich.
661, 340 N.W.2d 631 (1983); State v. Towne, 142 Vt. 241, 453 A.2d 1133 (1982). In connec-
tion with the Barrel of Fun decision, see infra note 41. But see United States v. Affleck, 765
F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Paddack v. Dave Christensen, Inc., 745 F.2d 1254 (9th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Ramos, 725 F.2d 1322 (11th Cir. 1984). See generally, Rossi,
Modern Evidence and the Expert Witness, 12 LTGATION, Fall 1985, at 18. For additional
authorities on both sides, see C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 38-41 (3d ed. 1984);
Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony, supra note 20, at 247-50.
26. See, e.g., State v. Henze, 356 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1984). For a discussion of Henze,
[Vol. 39:577
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subjects, such as chemistry, physics, or engineering, a highly quali-
fied expert may develop his opinions from primary records gener-
ated exclusively by other professionals. While some of these under-
lying records will have been offered and received into evidence by
the time the expert testifies, others will not. In selected cases,
counsel may not have formally introduced any of the supporting
data, especially when that data comes from offices in distant parts
of the country. In these circumstances the question that arises is
whether the lawyer who calls an expert is entitled to read the un-
derlying records into evidence.
As has been explained, strict principles of expert, hearsay, and
confrontation law require that the answer to the above question be
an emphatic no.27 While underlying records might qualify as ad-
missible business records, virtually every formulation of the busi-
ness records exception requires an authenticating witness from the
office that generated the record. A records custodian knows the
regularity of the entries contained in the offered record, the timeli-
ness of the entries, and the type of knowledge possessed by indi-
viduals participating in the recordmaking process. 8
This Essay is not intended to suggest that experts should be
denied the use of unadmitted hearsay to form and propound ex-
pert opinions. Rather, the analysis speaks to the impropriety of re-
ceiving in wholesale fashion the unauthenticated background data
as an exhibit on behalf of the party that offered the expert's court-
room opinion. Once the expert identifies the sources for his conclu-
sions during direct examination, the reference to outside material
is complete. Furthermore, in criminal cases, permitting the expert
to go beyond this point and recite extensively from another per-
son's report significantly damages the confrontation clause of the
Constitution. This back door introduction of the contents of a non-
testifying expert's report, without producing the author of the ma-
terial, impinges on the criminal defendant's sixth amendment
rights.
To protect against litigation based on unsworn allegations con-
tained in the report of a nontestifying expert, it may be time to
see supra note 5.
27. See, eg., Commonwealth v. Kendall, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 152, 399 N.E.2d 1115 (1980)
(holding that in the guise of giving the reasons for his opinion the expert cannot testify to
matters that are not admissible under a recognized hearsay rule exception).
28. Evidence presented by a witness who receives a report or letter generally is insuffi-
cient to establish the document as a business record of the recipient. See, e.g., State v.
Wright, 367 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1985).
1986]
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consider careful revision of Federal Evidence Rule 703. Such revi-
sion would lend predictability to expert witness practice and settle
the question whether Rule 703 creates a giant exception to the
hearsay rule for otherwise inadmissible hearsay reports and
opinions.29
III. SUMMARIZING THE JUDICIAL ROLE
It is perhaps valuable at this juncture to identify in systematic
fashion some of the prominent steps involved in the admission of
expert testimony. The decisions and inquiries that frequently mark
this process are set forth below.
The court first must determine whether the expert is suffi-
ciently qualified to testify. 0 Rule 702 provides a liberal standard
that allows an expert to be qualified by academic training or life
experiences. Notable examples in the latter category include al-
lowing a long-time farmer to provide an opinion about a probable
corn yield3 l or permitting a witness who has been an equipment
29. This unsettled issue has been referred to in commentaries. See, e.g., 83 FED. R.
EVID. NEWS 78 (1983); 78 FED. R. Evm. NEWS 118 (1978) (citing State v. Rolls, 389 A.2d 824
(Me. 1978)); see also 85 FED. R. EVID. NEWS 23 (1985).
Revision of the rules may be in the offing. The Federal Rules of Evidence will receive an
official review for the first time since their adoption in 1975. An ad hoc committee of the
Judicial Conference of the United States will study the rules and receive suggestions for
amendments. Federal Evidence Rules Slated for First Review, 11 LITIGATION NEWS, Winter
1986, at 7. One American Bar Association committee already has considered many of the
principles advanced in the foregoing section of this Essay. The Rules of Evidence and Pro-
cedure Committee of the Section of Criminal Justice, meeting on January 4, 1986, favorably
reviewed the concept of imposing appropriate safeguards on the use at trial of underlying
expert data, subject to further drafting of detailed rule language.
One productive idea might be to add a new section (b) to Rule 703 incorporating the
following concept:
In criminal cases, and generally in civil cases, underlying expert data must be indepen-
dently admissible in order to be received in evidence. An expert's reliance on unadmit-
ted data does not mandate introduction of the data, where the sole reason for introduc-
tion is that it formed a basis for the expert's opinion. When good cause is shown in civil
cases and the underlying information is particularly trustworthy, the court may admit
the data under this rule to illustrate the basis for the expert's opinion.
Under the proposed revision, part (a) of Rule 703 would retain the present rule without
change. The concept embraced in tentative subdivision (b) holds the promise of restricting
use of inadmissible underlying data to its proper role, that of supporting an expert's opinion
without becoming independent evidence. In particularly compelling circumstances, and es-
pecially in civil cases, judges might admit reliable background documentation. They cer-
tainly can do so when it comports with other rules of admission, including the catchall ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule in Federal Evidence Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5). With careful
rule revision, modern expert witness practice can move forward without unduly trampling
upon established hearsay doctrine or confrontation rights.
30. Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1242.
31. See Federal Crop. Ins. Corp. v. Hester, 765 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1985).
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service manager for three years to testify whether a front-end
loader is defective.32 When qualifications are lacking, the court will
exclude the opinion testimony.3
The court also must determine whether the proffered evi-
dence would be helpful to the trier of fact. 4 One commentator
writes that "a Ph.D. can be found to swear to almost any 'expert'
proposition, no matter how false or foolish. 3 5 Before deferring to
the expert, the court should ascertain that the expert's field of spe-
cialty, as well as the area of his expected testimony, will assist the
trier of fact. With the large number of expert specialties available
for courtroom testimony, 6 there may be topics upon which the
jury does not need the aid of an expert.
3 7
When the expert relies on unadmitted data, the trial court
must decide whether this data is of a type reasonably relied on by
experts in the field. The proper foundation for expert opinion re-
quires that the testifying expert affirm that he regularly relies on
nonrecord matter of the kind involved in the litigated case.38 After
32. See Dildine v. Clark Equip. Co., 285 Ark. 325, 686 S.W.2d 791 (1985).
33. See, e.g., Herman v. Speed King Mfg. Co., 675 P.2d 1271 (Wyo. 1984); Reinhardt
v. Colton, 337 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. 1983).
34. See Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1242.
35. Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in
the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 333 (1985).
36. See the introductory remarks in this Essay for further details. In a recent inter-
view in Litigation, attorney James F. Neal described his voir dire examination of a "self-
proclaimed expert" who had "proposed to testify as an expert on everything from unsafe
coffeepots to unsafe railroad cars." Schwartz, Evidence in the Pinto Case: An Interview
with James F. Neal, LITIGATION, Fall 1985, at 29, 32.
37. See Zimmer v. Miller Trucking Co., 743 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1984) (expert testimony
that concerns subject matter within the knowledge of laymen is superfluous). For a case
excluding expert testimony because psychological stress evaluation does not command suffi-
cient scientific acceptance, see Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739
F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984) (precedents hold that polygraph evidence is likewise inadmissible).
On the other hand, courts should be alert to new areas of endeavor with potential for
assisting the truth determination process. United States v. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.
1985) (expert on use of beepers and codes by narcotics dealers); WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724
F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) (expert in the field of regional English to explain origin and mean-
ing of word "opry"); Schaffter v. Ward, 17 Ohio St. 3d 79, 477 N.E.2d 1116 (1985) (engineer
should have been allowed to testify on point-of-impact in accident case; engineer's opinion
could have aided jury). For a collection of cases on the admissibility of expert testimony on
rape trauma syndrome as well as similar syndromes affecting battered wives and children,
see Annot., 42 AKL.R. 4th 879 (1985) (cases on both sides). Another 1985 annotation collects
decisions concerning when expert testimony will assist the trier of fact so as to be admissible
under Federal Evidence Rule 702. Annot., 75 AL.R. FED. 462 (1985).
38. The foundation for expert opinion sometimes is flawed by a failure to include evi-
dence of personal reliance. One court noted that an expert economist did not state that he
normally would base his opinion on the type of information submitted to him. American
Key Corp. v. Cole Nat'l Corp., 762 F.2d 1569, 1580 (11th Cir. 1985); see also State v. Rolls,
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the specialist states that he considered such material in forming
his opinion, he should identify whether his professional judgments
are based in whole or in part on this information.3 9 Thereafter, the
proponent must establish that other, similar experts place reasona-
ble and customary reliance on the kind of material upon which the
expert relied.40 Finally, several courts impose a requirement that
the trial judge make an independent assessment of the underlying
data.
Numerous cases in addition to Agent Orange endorse this last
requirement-a special assessment of trustworthiness. In Barrel of
Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,41 for example, expert
testimony was based on a psychological stress evaluation (PSE).
By measuring stress in a person's voice, this evaluation purport-
edly indicates whether the individual is lying. The Fifth Circuit
held "that PSE evidence, whether in the form of raw data or ex-
pert opinion interpreting or extrapolating upon that data, is inher-
ently suspect.' '42 In deciding whether to permit expert opinion, the
court held that "the trustworthiness of the underlying data is not
irrelevant. ' '43 Similarly, in rejecting the testimony of a consulting
engineer, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that while the basis of
expert testimony need not be admissible in evidence, the facts that
are contrary to the undisputed evidence in the case cannot be rea-
sonably relied on by experts."
Unfortunately, this sort of testing of underlying data is not
universal. In Indian Coffee Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,4" the
Third Circuit clearly emphasized the standard of reliance by ex-
perts in the field rather than the trial court's judgment of the
trustworthiness of the underlying materials.4 6 In another jurisdic-
389 A.2d 824, 824 (Me. 1978) (experts must rely on data for "purposes other than testifying
in a lawsuit").
39. Suggested questions to lay a proper foundation appear in R. CARLSON, supra note
20, § 4:20, at 219-20.
40. See Carlson, supra note 20, at 240-41.
41. 739 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984).
42. Id. at 1033.
43. Id. at 1033 (quoting Emerging Problems Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
1983 A.BA. SEc. LIT. 208). Without changing its position regarding the inadmissibility of the
"raw data," the court suggested that an expert's opinion might be proper when based only
partly on a PSE test. Id. at 1034. The court, however, rejected the opinion testimony be-
cause it found the opinion to be based exclusively on PSE test results. Id.
44. KN Energy, Inc. v. Great W. Sugar Co., 698 P.2d 769 (Colo.), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 3489 (1985); see also Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1984)
(expert opinion excluded when based on unrealistic assumptions).
45. 752 F.2d 891 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 180 (1985).
46. See also In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983),
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tion, a state supreme court announced a rule of judicial notice that
physicians customarily rely on records prepared by other doctors
in forming opinions about a patient's medical condition. 7 A dis-
senting justice expressed concern about the generalized extension
of judicial notice and spoke of the need for trial courts to make
particularized factual determinations:
I do not doubt that medical doctors often rely upon medical records pre-
pared by other persons in forming their own opinions or drawing some kinds
of inferences. I am unwilling to stretch that general observation into a judi-
cially noticed fact that would satisfy rule 703 whenever a medical doctor
wishes to give opinion testimony based in part on another doctor's medical
records, regardless of the type of record, type of medical specialty, and type
of opinion or inference to be drawn. The admissibility of opinion testimony
based on hearsay should depend on the circumstances of each specific case,
not on judicial notice of what doctors routinely rely upon in general.'
Judge Weinstein apparently agrees with this justice's emphasis
upon factual determinations by trial judges. In his Agent Orange
opinion, Judge Weinstein observed:
[C]areful scrutiny of proposed evidence is especially appropriate in the toxic
tort area. The uncertainty of the evidence in such cases, dependent as it is
upon speculative scientific hypotheses and epidemiological studies, creates a
special need for robust screening of experts and gatekeeping under Rules 403
and 703 by the court.4
Is the expert's testimony, in whole or in part, unduly preju-
dicial or misleading? Is the testimony in proper form? Once other
tests are met, the court still must exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury, or if admission would
cause unnecessary delays.50 It is important to note that expert
opinion evidence complying with Rule 703 can still pose confusion
and prejudice problems under Rule 403.51 Moreover, the expert's
cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 1863 (1985). The petition for Supreme Court review in this case
raised the question whether a federal trial judge is powerless to exclude expert testimony
that is "based upon false or unsupported factual assumptions" simply because other experts
in the field may rely on similar types of information. 54 U.S.L.W. 3045 (U.S., Aug. 6, 1985)
(No. 83-2004). Certiorari was granted on other questions. 105 S. Ct. 1863 (1985).
47. State v. Henze, 356 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1984). For a discussion of Henze, see supra
note 5.
48. Id. at 541 (Wolle, J., dissenting).
49. 611 F. Supp. at 1260. At another point, the court noted that the assumptions that
form the basis for the expert's opinion should be subjected to "rigorous examination" in the
mass toxic tort context. Id. at 1244. Judge Weinstein added, "(T]he court may not abdicate
its independent responsibilities to decide if the bases meet minimum standards of reliability
as a condition of admissibility." Id. at 1245; see also id. at 1239.
50. FED. R. EvID. 403.
51. See 85 FED. R. EvID. NEws 103 (1985) (citing United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983
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testimony must comply with additional norms, including the fol-
lowing: an expert usually is not allowed to testify about conclu-
sions of law or legal criteria necessary for the establishment of lia-
bility,52 causation questions put to experts must be properly
phrased,53 and evidence of causation must be sufficient to satisfy
legal standards. 54
Appropriate limits should be placed on the use of underlying
data at trial. Underlying data may be identified as a basis for an
expert's opinion, but it should not automatically become affirma-
tive evidence on behalf of the proponent of the witness. Of course,
when the background information meets the requirements of other
rules, it may be independently admissible. 5
5
IV. CLOSING THE CIRCLE: CROSS-EXAMINATION WHEN THE BASIS
FOR EXPERT OPINION Is LACKING
This Essay has concentrated on several of the primary
problems in expert witness examination, including the court's role
in testing whether underlying data was reasonably relied on by an
expert, as well as the need to confine that data to its proper role.
Completeness requires a brief look at a related concern. What if
the expert presents an opinion and then cannot recall the support-
ing data from which that opinion was derived? What if the expert
recalls the data, but refuses to reveal it?
Legal policy allows an opposing party to force full disclosure
(11th Cir. 1985)); see also United States v. Daly, 756 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1985); Barrel of
Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th Cir. 1984); In re
Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1255 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
52. See, e.g., Miller v. Bonar, 337 N.W.2d 523, 529 (Iowa 1983) (testimony to a legal
conclusion on domestic law not allowed; upon redirect examination, state trooper testified
that driver was in violation of state code). Professor Rossi notes that inroads have been
made in this rule in certain areas of litigation, citing securities and tax matters, among
others. Rossi, supra note 25, at 24.
53. See, e.g., State v. Burke, 368 N.W.2d 182, 186 (Iowa 1985) ("[W]hen expert testi-
mony indicating a possibility of causation of a particular condition by a particular circum-
stance is coupled with nonexpert testimony to the effect that the condition did not exist
before the occurrence of the circumstance that allegedly caused it, then a jury question as to
causation is generated."). See generally R. CARLSON, supra note 20, § 4:26, at 230-31. (ques-
tioning experts on medical causation).
54. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1261 (E.D.N.Y.
1985); see also Note, Increased Risk of Harm: A New Standard for Sufficiency of Evidence
of Causation in Medical Malpractice Cases, 65 B.U.L. Rev. 275 (1985) (in medical malprac-
tice suits it is difficult to distinguish between the effects of the plaintiff's disease and the
effects of the doctor's negligence).
55. For an example of a doctor's testimony predicated upon patient's statements, see
O'Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1978). See also FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
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of an expert's underlying facts on cross-examination. Thus, when a
direct examiner chooses, as is his option, to produce an expert's
opinion without a full explanation of all of the tests and findings
that went into forming the expert's conclusions,56 the cross-exam-
iner can force the expert to reveal the underlying data.57 What if
the examiner is denied cross-examination rights because of an un-
willing or forgetful expert? Will the court impose sanctions?
Although at first blush this hypothetical may seem remote and
far-fetched, a 1985 opinion by the United States Supreme Court
reviewed such a situation. In Delaware v. Fensterer,58 an expert for
the prosecution could not recall why he reached a particular con-
clusion.59 Although the Delaware Supreme Court felt that the de-
fense counsel's cross-examination of the agent was an exercise in
futility, the United States Supreme Court upheld the prosecution.
The Supreme Court held that no confrontation violation occurred
because it found no court-imposed restriction on the scope of
cross-examination. The Court noted: "In this case, defense coun-
sel's cross-examination of Agent Robillard demonstrated to the
jury that Robillard could not even recall the theory on which his
opinion was based."60 Apparently, the Court concluded that the
opportunity to discredit expert witness testimony is sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the confrontation clause.
The Fensterer decision, however, does not foreclose a different
result in cases in which a witness' lapse of memory totally frus-
trates any opportunity for cross-examination.' Neither does the
opinion dictate a submissive approach by the court when a witness
who is well acquainted with the basis for his opinion stubbornly
and contumaciously refuses to disclose it.6 5 Finally, statutory for-
56. FED. R. EVID. 705. A deviation from the text pattern may occur at the summary
judgment stage. In making the decision whether a material issue of fact exists, the court
may need to know the basis for the expert's opinion. Further, the civil procedure rule con-
trolling summary judgments requires specific facts. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56; Evers v. General
Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984 (11th Cir. 1985). But see Bulthuis v. Rexall Corp., No.84-6090
(9th Cir. 1985) (holding that an expert opinion which is not supported by a description of
underlying facts may be admissible and may defeat summary judgment if the affiant ap-
pears competent to give an expert opinion on the subject).
57. FED. R. EVID. 705. Sometimes this data may consist of a report or other document.
When the expert's reliance on the document is shown, and "the witness is properly cross-
examined, the reference to the report is for impeachment purposes, not substantive evi-
dence." Carlson, supra note 20, at 246 n.50.
58. 106 S. Ct. 292 (1985) (per curiam).
59. Id. at 293.
60. Id. at 295.
61. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 169 n.18 (1970).
62. See C. MCCORMICK supra note 25, at 48-49 (cross-examiner may have the direct
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mulae that inappropriately emasculate the right of cross-examina-
tion will not be tolerated. 3
V. CONCLUSION
One of the great contributions of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence was the modernization of expert witness practice. Rule 703
broadened the bases for expert opinions by aligning courtroom
procedures with the day-to-day approach of technicians, doctors,
and other specialists. Under the Federal Rules, experts now can
supply forensic opinions based on data made known to the expert
outside of court, even though some of that data might not be ad-
missible in evidence. Rule 703 thus sweeps away archaic restric-
tions and allows a testifying expert to state opinions based on non-
record information.6
Nevertheless, just as the foregoing proposition has become
firmly established in the cases, new problems have arisen with
which courts are beginning to cope. Some recent decisions have an-
nounced special rules for testing the reliability of information upon
which expert opinions are based. Another issue that courts increas-
ingly confront is the proper role of the expert's underlying data.
This Essay has argued that the wholesale introduction of this data
into evidence is totally inappropriate. Furthermore, in criminal
cases the exclusion of this data is mandated by the confrontation
clause of the United States Constitution. Still, few commentators
have addressed this vital constitutional issue.6 5 As one court char-
acterized the issue, a predominant question today is not what data
an expert may rely on, but what data the expert may put into evi-
dence. 6 Modern expert witness rules do not grant a license for tes-
tifying technicians freely to tell juries what other nontestifying ex-
perts concluded about the case. Rule 703 must never become the
examination testimony stricken from the record).
63. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); see also M. LADD & R. CARLSON, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 129 (1972) (appellate court reversal when "trial judge improp-
erly cuts off cross-examination"). In United States v. Jones, 766 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1985),
the court ruled that the confrontation clause protects the right of a defendant to cross-
examine witnesses for bias and that a judge's refusal to permit cross-examination may re-
quire reversal. This decision reviews the law regarding rebuffed homosexual advances, an
area of cross-examination allowed in a number of courts.
64. See, e.g., Mannino v. International Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1981).
65. Fortunately, courts have addressed this constitutional issue. See State v. Towne,
142 Vt. 241, 453 A.2d 1133 (1982) (that forensic psychiatrists reinforced his opinion through
consultation with another specialist did not authorize psychiatrist to relay conclusions of a
witness never brought to court).
66. See. id. at 246, 453 A.2d at 1135.
[Vol. 39:577
1986] MODERN EXPERT TESTIMONY 593
back door exception to the hearsay rule because the sixth amend-
ment entitles a defendant to confront his accusers.

